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WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR. *
The proliferation of Private Investments in Public Equity
("PIPEs') and the success enjoyed by hedge funds in
investing in them has caught the attention of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC'). Over the
last two years, the SEC has brought a number of
enforcement actions against hedge funds accusing them of
insider trading and violations of the registration
requirement of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act') in connection with PIPE investments. Additionally,
the SEC has recently reinterpreted the dividing line
between a primary and secondary resale offering in an
effort to rein in the PIPE market. This article discusses
and analyzes these developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private Investments in Public Equity ("PIPEs") have become an
important source of financing for many public companies. In 2006,
companies closed on 1,329 PIPE deals raising approximately $28.2 billion
in the aggregate.1 These numbers easily surpass the previous records of
1,106 deals and $23.3 billion set in 2000 (the height of the dot-com
bubble).2 While companies of all sizes have used PIPEs to raise money,
Associate Professor, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
See Sagient Research Systems, Inc., PlacementTracker, Private Placement Resources,
http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type-6 (last visited Aug. 30, 2007).
2 The following table sets forth the annual number of PIPE deals and aggregate dollar
amounts raised from 1995 to 2006. See id The data excludes PIPE deals by Canadian
companies.
Year Deals Amount
2006 1,343 $28,308,956,049
2005 1,304 $20,010,059,164
2004 1,270 $15,641,845,069
2003 882 $12,632,749,396
2002 707 $12,264,034,876
2001 898 $14,604,527,934
2000 1,106 $24,337,925,804
1999 676 $10,258,789,616
1998 428 $2,998,805,923
1997 448 $4,747,221,485
1996 306 $4,101,292,110
382 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 2.1
JOURNAL
PIPE deals have emerged as a vital financing source for small public
companies. In fact, approximately 90 percent of all PIPE deals in 2006
were completed by companies with market capitalizations of $250 million
or less.3 This is driven by the reality that PIPEs represent the only available
4financing option for many small public companies.
Hedge funds provide a large percentage of small company PIPE
financing. 5 They do so because it pays off; PIPE investments have earned
hedge funds market-beating returns.6 These favorable returns have not,
however, resulted from improved post-financing performance by PIPE
issuers. As a group, PIPE issuers have performed poorly before and after
PIPE financings. Hedge funds are nonetheless able to beat the market
because of advantageous deal terms they secure from PIPE issuers.8
The proliferation of PIPEs and the success enjoyed by hedge funds
in investing in them have caught the attention of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Over the last two years, the SEC has
brought a number of enforcement actions against hedge funds accusing
them of insider trading and violations of the registration requirement of the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") 9 in connection with PIPE
investments. Additionally, the SEC has recently reinterpreted the dividing
line between a primary and secondary resale offering in an effort to rein in
the PIPE market.
This article discusses and analyzes these developments. Part II
describes common characteristics of PIPE deals, including the types of
securities issued and the basic trading strategy employed by hedge funds.
Part III details securities law compliance issues with respect to PIPE
transactions. Part IV explores recent SEC enforcement actions. In
particular, it critiques the SEC's stance that covering a short sale with PIPE
1995 114 SI,334,025,502
Total 10,372 $186,335,356,738
3 Gregory Sichenzia, Panel Discussion at the Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal
Symposium: IPOs in the Internet Age: The Case for Updated Regulations (Mar. 2,
2007). "Nano-cap" companies (companies with market capitalizations below $50
million) completed 53% of the deals, and "micro cap" companies (companies with
market capitalizations from $50 to $250 million) completed 27% of the deals. See id.
4 See Susan J. Chaplinsky and David Haushalter, Financing Under Extreme
Uncertainty: Contract Terms and Returns to Private Investments in Public Equity (May
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-907676.
5 See id; David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors as Last Resort?, REV. OF
FIN. STUD., forthcoming. Available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id-782791.
6 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 4; Brophy, supra note 5, at 4.
7 See Chaplinsly & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 3.
8 See id at 14; Brophy, supra note 5, at 4.
9 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006). See infra Part IV (discussing recent SEC enforcement
actions).
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shares violates Section 5 of the Securities Act. Part V argues that by
investing in a PIPE and promptly selling short the issuer's common stock, a
hedge fund is essentially underwriting a follow-on public offerings while
legally avoiding many of the regulations applicable to underwriters. This
"regulatory arbitrage" makes it possible for hedge funds to secure the
advantageous terms responsible for the market-beating returns they have
garnered from PIPE investments. Part V then discusses the SEC's response
and the effect the response has on PIPE issuers. Considering the
importance of PIPE financing to small public companies, Part VI concludes
that a more measured and transparent SEC approach to PIPE regulation is
in order.
II. PIPE CHARACTERISTICS
A PIPE is a type of financing transaction undertaken by a public
company, normally with a small number of sophisticated investors. In a
typical PIPE, the company relies on an exemption from SEC registration
requirements to issue investors common stock or securities convertible into
common stock for cash.10 The company then registers the resale of the
common stock issued in the private placement, or issued upon conversion
of the convertible securities issued in the private placement, with the SEC.''
Generally, investors must hold securities issued in a private placement for
at least one year.' 2 However, because the company registers the resale of
the PIPE shares, investors are free to sell them into the market as soon as
the SEC declares the resale registration statement effective (typically within
a few months of the closing of the private placement). 13
A. Types of PIPEs
PIPE transactions are highly negotiated; hence there is a fair
amount of variation from deal to deal with respect to the attributes of the
PIPE securities. 14  PIPE securities may consist of common stock orsecurities convertible into common stock, such as convertible preferred
10 James R. Tanenbaum & Anna T. Pinedo, The Law: Legal and Regulatory
Framework, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 77, 93
(rev. & updated ed. 2006).
111d. at 99.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 79 & 80.
See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 1.
14 See Brophy, supra note 5 ("[T]he negotiations between the issuing companies and
their investors in private issuances result in highly customized securities."); Richard E.
Gormley, OVERVIEW: AN EMERGING MARKET, IN PIPEs: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 9, 13 (rev. & updated ed. 2006) ("Although the PIPE
market is becoming more standardized each year ... ], it remains a highly negotiated
marketplace.").
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stock or convertible notes, and may be coupled with common stock
warrants.15 Regardless of the type of securities involved, PIPE deals are
categorized as either traditional or structured.16 With a traditional PIPE, the
PIPE shares are issued at a price fixed on the closing date of the private
placement.1 7 This fixed price is typically set at a discount to the trailing
average of the market price of the issuer's common stock for some period
of days prior to closing of the private placement.18 As mentioned above,
securities regulations generally prohibit investors from selling PIPE shares
prior to the SEC declaring the resale registration statement effective.19
Thus, because the deal price is fixed, investors in traditional PIPEs assume
price risk, which is the risk of future declines in the market price of the
issuer's common stock during the pendency of the resale registration
statement. Of the 1,343 PIPE deals closed in 2006, 1,111 (82.7%) involved
traditional PIPEs. 20
With a structured PIPE, the issuance price of the PIPE shares is not
fixed on the closing date of the private placement. Instead it adjusts (often,
downward only) 21 based on future price movements of the issuer's common
stock.2 2 For example, investors may be issued convertible debt or preferred
stock that is convertible into common stock based on a floating or variable
conversion price, i.e., the conversion price fluctuates with the market price
of the issuer's common stock.23 Hence, with a structured PIPE, investors
15 Gormley, supra note 14, at 13.
16 See Brophy, supra note 5, at 2.
17 See id.
" See Gormley, supra note 14, at 22. The trailing average is customarily based on
either the closing bid prices or volume weighted average prices for the issuer's common
stock from one to twenty days prior to closing.
19 See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 13.
20 See Sagient Research Systems, Inc., PlacementTracker - Private Placement
Resources, http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type-4 (last visited Sept. 7,
2007). The data excludes PIPE deals by Canadian companies.
21See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 13 (In a recent study of structured
PIPEs, Chaplinsky & Haushalter found about half cap upward adjustments at market
price on the private placement closing date. They did note that some PIPE securities do
allow the conversion price to adjust upward above the price on the issuance date but no
PIPE securities included in the sample provided for unlimited upside adjustment. Id. at
14.).
22 See Brophy, supra note 5, at 7. See also E. Kurt Kim, The Marketplace: A
STATISTICAL SUMMARY, IN PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC
EQUITY 27, 43 (rev. & updated ed. 2006).
23 See id. See also Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 13. A variation on the
theme is a conversion price reset feature. With such a feature, the conversion price is
initially fixed but adjusts or resets on a particular day or days in the future based on the
then existing market price of the issuer's common stock. For example, a convertible
note with a reset price feature may initially fix the conversion price at 90% of the
market price on the closing date but provide for adjustment six months and one year
from the closing date to 90% of the market price of the issuer's common stock on the
adjustment date. Id. See also Kim, supra note 22, at 42.
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do not assume price risk during the pendency of the resale registration
statement.24 If the market price declines, so too does the conversion price,
and therefore the PIPE securities will be convertible into a greater number
of shares of common stock.
For example, say an investor purchases a $1,000,000 convertible
note in a PIPE transaction, and the note provides that the principal amount
is convertible at the holder's option into the issuer's common stock at a
conversion rate of 90-percent of the per share market price of the stock on
the date of conversion. Thus, if the market price of the issuer's common
stock is $10 per share, the note is convertible at $9.00 a share into I 11,111
shares of common stock. If the market price drops to $8 per share, the note
is then convertible at $7.20 per share into 138,889 shares of common stock.
Regardless of how low the price drops, upon conversion the investor will
receive $1,000,000 of common stock based on the discounted market price
of the stock on the day of conversion.
Some structured PIPEs do contain floors on how low the
conversion price can adjust downward or caps on how many shares can be
21issued upon conversion. If a structured PIPE has neither a floor nor cap, it
can potentially become convertible into a controlling stake of the PIPE
issuer. Continuing the example from above, if the market price dropped to
$0.01, the note would then be convertible into more than 100 million
shares,26 which would constitute a controlling stake unless the issuer had at
least 200 million shares outstanding. Hence, structured PIPEs lacking
floors or caps are pejoratively labeled "death spirals" or "toxic converts"
because investors in these deals may be tempted to push down the issuer's
stock price through short sales, circulating false negative rumors, etc., so
that their structured PIPEs become convertible into a controlling stake of
27the issuer. Of the 1,343 PIPE deals closed in 2006, 317 (23.6%) involved
structured PIPEs 8
B. Registration Requirement
The registration requirement of a PIPE transaction can be either
concurrent or trailing. With a concurrent registration requirement, investors
commit to buy a specified dollar amount of PIPE securities in the private
placement, but their obligations to fund are conditional on the SEC
24 See Brophy, supra note 5, at 7.
25 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 13.
26 The calculation would be $1,000,000/($0.01 x 0.9) - 111,111,111.
27 See Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPEs: Why the SEC Can and Should Expand
Reporting Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities, 58 Bus.
LAW. 655, 658 (2003).
28 See Sagient Research Systems, Inc., PlacementTracker Private Placement
Resources, http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type-5 (last visited Sept. 7,
2007).
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indicating that it is prepared to declare the resale registration statement
effective2 9 If the SEC never gets to this point, the investors do not have to
go forward with the deal. Thus, the issuer bears the registration risk; that is,
the risk that the SEC will refuse to declare the resale registration statement
effective.
With a trailing registration rights requirement, the parties close on
the private placement and then the issuer files a registration statement.30
Consequently, the investors bear the registration risk. If the issuer never
files or the SEC never declares the registration statement effective, the
investors will not be able to sell their PIPE shares into the market for at
least one year.31  As a result, PIPE deals that include such trailing
registration requirements typically obligate the issuer to file the registration
statement within thirty days of the private placement closing date and
require that it be declared effective within 90 to 120 days of such date. 32 If
these deadlines are not met, the issuer is obligated to pay the investors a
penalty of 1-percent to 2-percent of the deal proceeds per month until filing
or effectiveness.
33
C. PIPE Issuers
As mentioned above, the large majority of PIPE deals are
undertaken by small public companies. These companies generally pursue
PIPEs not because they offer advantages over other financing alternatives
but because the companies have no other financing alternatives. 34 By and
large, PIPE issuers are not only small in terms of market capitalization but
have weak cash flow and poorly performing stocks. A recent study of PIPE
issuers by Professors Chaplinsky and Haushalter found that "more than
84% of PIPE issuers have negative operating cash flow and over 50% of the
issuers have falling stock prices in the year prior to issue. ' 35 Further, a
majority of them will run out of cash within a year unless they obtain
36
additional financing. Thus, traditional forms of financing are simply not
29 See Tanenbaum & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 100.3 0 See id. at 105.
31 See infra note 58 & 59.
32 See Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Raising Capital Through a PIPE Transaction, 2006, at 2,
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor25 2006/pidgeon lewis pipes.pdf.
33 See id.
34 The primary purported advantages of financing through a PIPE is speed. Id It is not
uncommon for a PIPE deal to close within seven to ten days of receiving definitive
purchase commitments whereas a follow-on underwritten equity offering can take from
three to nine months. Tanenbaum & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 100. This quick
timeframe is possible because a PIPE can be structured so that no pre-closing SEC
review and clearance is required, and PIPE investors generally perform much less due
diligence on the PIPE issuer than an underwriter would.
35 Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 2.
36 ,,
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an option. 3 7  Few, if any, investment banking firms are willing to
underwrite follow-on offerings for small, distressed public companies. 38
Further, these companies lack the collateral and financial performance to
qualify for bank loans and the upside potential to attract traditional private
equity financing.39
Given the distressed status of PIPE issuers, PIPE financing can, of
course, be very expensive. Not only does the company typically issue
common stock or common stock equivalents at a discount to market price,
but PIPE deals often involve other cash flow rights such as dividends or
interest (typically paid in kind not cash) and warrants. 4 0 After taking into
account these cash flow rights and protective features such as floating
conversion prices, Chaplinsky and Haushalter found that the "all-in net
purchase discount" 4 1 for PIPE deals ranges from 14.3% to 34.7%.42
Not surprisingly, PIPE issuers continue to perform poorly
following PIPE financings.4 3 Chaplinsky and Haushalter found negative
abnormal returns to existing shareholders of PIPE issuers of -16% after
twelve months (with a median of -43%) and -33% after twenty-four months
(with a median of -70%). 44 Additionally, the stock of 28-percent of issuers
was delisted within twenty-four months following the PIPE financing.45
D. PIPE Investors
This dismal post-PIPE performance of course raises the question of
who is investing in PIPEs. The answer is hedge funds.46 They constitute
nearly 80% of the investors in micro-cap PIPEs.4  Hedge funds invest for
the obvious reason: their returns from PIPE investments meet or beat
market benchmarks.48  Chaplinsky and Haushalter estimated PIPE
37 See id. at 8.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id. at 12. ("In sum the pervasive nature of poor pre-issue operating and stock
performance, as well as their generally small size, suggests that PIPE issuers are not
candidates for debt financing or follow-on stock financing.
40 See id. at 3.
41 Chaplinsley & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 16 (Estimated value of PIPE securities at
time of issuance relative to amount invested.).
42 See id. at 3-4.
41 Id. at 3.
44 id.
45 id.
46 Id.at 8. See also Brophy, supra note 5, at 10.
47 Carolyn Sargent, Squeezing the PIPEs, ABSOLUTE RETURN 12 (Feb. 2007). See also
Carol E. Curtis, As Hedge Funds Invest in Pipes, SEC Steps Up Scrutiny,
SECURITIES INDUSTRY NEWS 12 (Oct. 23, 2006 ) (noting that "hedge funds
seeking discounted securities are the largest group of investors in [PIPEs]," and that
the top ten PIPE investors by number of deals in 2006 (through October) were all hedge
funds).
48See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 4. See also Brophy, supra note 5, at 4.
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investors' excessive returns using various benchmarks and found that "from
three to twelve months post-issue, average returns consistently exceed
benchmark returns, often by double digits. 49
Hedge funds are able to obtain these returns notwithstanding the
poor performance of PIPE issuers through a relatively straightforward
trading strategy. They sell short the issuer's common stock promptly after
the PIPE deal is publicly disclosed. 50 To execute a short sale, a fund
borrows stock of the PIPE issuer from a broker-dealer and sells this
borrowed stock into the market.5' The fund then closes out or covers the
short sale at a later date by buying shares in the open market and delivering
them to the lender. 52 By shorting stock against the PIPE shares, the fund
locks in the PIPE deal purchase discount.5 3 With a traditional PIPE, if the
market price of the issuer's common stock drops below the discounted price
following a PIPE transaction, the fund will take a loss on the PIPE shares,
but this loss will be exceeded by gains realized when it closes out its short
position because it will be able to buy shares in the market to cover the
position at a lower price than it earlier sold the borrowed shares. If the
market price of the issuer's common stock rises after the PIPE transaction,
the fund will take a loss when closing out the short position because it will
have to buy shares to cover the position at a higher price than it earlier sold
the borrowed shares. This loss, however, will be exceeded by an increase
in the value of the PIPE shares since they were purchased at a discount to
the pre-rise market price 4
For example, say an issuer negotiates a traditional PIPE deal for the
sale of $1,000,000 of common stock to a hedge fund at a 15% discount to
market price. The issuer then discloses the deal to the market and its stock
drops from $11.00 to $10.00 per shares. Shortly thereafter, the parties close
the private placement, the fund wires $1,000,000 to the issuer, the issuer
issues 117,647 shares of common stock to the fund ($1,000,000 divided by
$8.50), and the fund sells short 117,647 shares of the issuer's common
stock at an average price of $9.50 or $1,117,646.50 in the aggregate. Three
months later, the PIPE resale registration statement is declared effective and
the fund unwinds its position, i.e., it sells its PIPE shares at the prevailing
market price of say $7.00 per share and covers its short position at $7.00
49 Chaplinsley & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 4.
50 See Steve Winters, Managing Risk: Securities Structures, Trading and
Documentation, PIPEs: A Guide to Private Investments in Public Equity Revised and
Updated Edition 205, 212 (2006).
51 See James W. Christian et al., Naked Short Selling: How Exposed are Investors?, 43
Hous. L. REV. 1033, 1041 (2006). See also 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2006) ("The term
short sale shall mean any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale
which is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of,
the seller.").
52 See Christian, supra note 51, at 1041-42.
53 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 18.
54 See id. at 18-19.
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per share resulting in the following profit on the transaction, excluding
transaction fees (legal fees, brokerage commissions, etc.).
Initial Investment <$1,000,000.00>
Proceeds from short sales $1,117,646.50
Proceeds from sales of PIPE shares $823,529.00
Cost to cover short position <$823,529.00>
Profit $117,646.50
90-day return 11.76%
Annualized return 47.04%
The above example assumes, among other things, that the fund will
be able to sell its PIPE shares and cover its short position at the same price
per share, likely an unrealistic assumption.5 However, even if the fund
covered its short position at $7.00 per share and sold its PIPE shares at
$6.50 per share, it would still make $58,823.50 on the deal, yielding a 90-
day return of 5.88% and an annualized return of 23.53%.
The strategy can be even more profitable for hedge funds in a
structured PIPE deal with a floating conversion price. If the issuer's stock
price drops, a fund profits on its short sales dollar for dollar. At the same
time, it also profits on the PIPE shares because the conversion price of the
PIPE securities is based on a discount to market price on the date of
conversion, i.e., the conversion price floats down with the market price.
Hence, the fund makes money on both sides of the trade, subject only to
unwinding risk.
56
For example, say an issuer negotiates a structured PIPE deal for the
sale of a $1,000,000 convertible note to a hedge fund. The note bears
interest at 10% per annum and provides that the principal amount and
interest is convertible at the holder's option into the issuer's common stock
at 85% of the per share market price on the date of conversion. The issuer
then discloses the deal to the market and its stock drops from $11.00 to
$10.00 per share. Shortly thereafter, the parties close the private placement,
the fund wires $1,000,000 to the issuer, the issuer issues the note, and the
fund sells short 117,647 shares of the issuer's common stock at an average
prices of $9.50 or $1,117,646.50 in the aggregate. Three months later, the
PIPE resale registration statement is declared effective at which time the
issuer's stock is trading at $7.00 per share. The fund converts the note into
173,669 shares of common stock based on $5.95 conversion price (85% of
$7.00), 57 sells these shares into the market at $7.00 per share, and covers its
55 This would be the case if the SEC allowed an investor to cover short sales with PIPE
shares, but, as discussed below, it does not. See infra text accompanying notes 140-46.
56 See id.
57 ($1,000,000.00 principal amount + $33,333.33 in interest)/$5.95 173,669
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short position at $7.00 per share resulting in the following profit on the
transaction, excluding transaction fees.
Initial Investment <$1,000,000.00>
Proceeds from short sales $1,117,646.50
Proceeds from sales of PIPE shares $1,215,683.00
Cost to cover short position <$823,529.00>
Profit $509,800.50
90-day return 50.98%
Annualized return 203.92%
This strategy is obviously dependent on a fund being able to
borrow shares to sell short. For a variety of reasons, however, there is often
a limited supply of PIPE issuer shares available in the equity lending
market." Thus, a fund may not be able to borrow enough shares to fully
lock in the discount through standard short sales. Some funds, however,
have allegedly dealt with this issue by engaging in naked short selling.59 A
naked short sale is simply the sale of shares for the account of an investor
who neither owns nor has borrowed the shares. 60 Naked short selling is not
necessarily illegal but may constitute illegal stock manipulation, depending
61
on intent.
In addition to short selling, many hedge funds retain upside
62potential by negotiating for warrants as part of a PIPE transaction. Hedge
funds typically hold on to these warrants even after unwinding their PIPE
shares positions so that they can profit further in the event the issuer's stock
happens to rise above the warrant exercise price. In sum, hedge funds are
able to garner superior returns through PIPE investments because they
purchase the PIPE shares at a substantial discount to market, manage their
downside risk through short sales and floating conversion prices, retain
upside potential through warrants, and liquidate their positions a relatively
short time after closing on the private placement.63
III. SECURITIES LAW COMPLIANCE
58 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 19. Among the reasons are lower
levels of institutional ownership (institutions are frequently the source of stock loans)
and brokerage firm restrictions on buying penny stock (stocks trading at $5 or less) on
margin (brokerage firms frequently lend out stock held in margin accounts). See id.
59 See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003 U.S. Dist. 17933
(N.D. IL 2003) at 6 available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp I 8020.htm.
60 See Christian, supra note 51, at 1044.
61 See id. at 1046.
62 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 16.
63 See id. at 14; Brophy, supra note 5, at 4 ("[B]eing an investor of last resort pays
off.").
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PIPE transactions raise a number of legal issues. This section
discusses compliance with federal and state securities laws and NASDAQ
listing requirements.
A. Federal Securities Laws
The Securities Act of 1933 requires that every offer and sale of a
security either be registered with the SEC or qualify for an exemption from
registration. 64  A PIPE involves two offerings-an exempt or private
offering by the issuer to the PIPE investors and a registered or public
offering by the PIPE investors to the public. This part discusses federal
securities law compliance for these two offerings.
1. Private Offering
A private offering, by definition, is conducted in compliance with
an exemption from registration as opposed to being registered with the
SEC. The Securities Act and rules promulgated thereunder contain a
number of registration exemptions. PIPE issuers generally rely on the
exemption provided by Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.61 Section 4(2)
exempts from registration "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering., 66  Thus, the application of Section 4(2) turns on the
definition of "public offering," but the Securities Act does not define the
term.6' The SEC has, however, promulgated Rule 506, which serves as a
Section 4(2) "safe harbor," i.e., if a private offering complies with the
conditions specified in Rule 506, the offering will be deemed exempt under
Section 4(2).68
To fall within the safe harbor, the offering must be limited to
accredited investors and no more than 35 non-accredited investors.
69
Virtually all hedge funds and the like qualify as accredited investors
because Rule 501(a) defines "accredited investor" as, among other things,
any business "not formed for the specific purposed of acquiring the
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006). See generally Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION § 2-B (3d ed. 1989).
65 Tanenbaum & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 93.
66 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
67 See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: it's Time to Allow General
Solicitation and Advertising in Exempt Qfferings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,35 (2004).
61 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2006) ("Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy
the conditions in paragraph (b) of this Rule 506 shall be deemed to be a transaction not
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the [Securities]
Act.").
69 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2)(i) & 501(e) (2006).
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securities offered, with total assets in excess of $5,000,000.''7 The issuer
has to furnish any non-accredited investors that purchase securities in the
offering certain specified information about the issuer and the offering a
reasonable time prior to the purchase and has to reasonably believe that all
non-accredited investors are sophisticated, either alone or with their
purchaser representatives.7  Typically, PIPE deals are marketed only to
accredited investors so that the issuer does not have to contend with
meeting these disclosure and sophistication requirements.7 2
Neither the issuer nor anyone acting on its behalf can solicit
investors in an offering made in reliance on Rule 506 through any form of
"general solicitation" or "general advertising., 73 For a communication to a
potential investor not to be considered general solicitation or advertising,
the SEC requires a pre-existing, substantive relationship between the
74
solicitor and potential investor. The SEC considers a relationship pre-
existing if it is established prior to the solicitation for the particular
offering. 5 The SEC considers a relationship substantive if it "would enable
the issuer (or a person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the financial
circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship
exists or that otherwise are of some substance and duration.
'
,
76
The only filing required to be made with the SEC for a Rule 506
offering is a nine page Form D setting forth some basic information about
the offering. 7 The company must file the Form D no later than fifteen days
after the first sale of securities.78 Securities issued in reliance on Rule 506
are considered "restricted securities., ' 79 This means a PIPE investor cannot
70 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3) (2006).
71 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2006). While Rule 502(b)(1) does not require that any
information be furnished to accredited investors in a Rule 505 or 506 offering, Rule
502(b)(1) includes a note that provides as follows: "When an issuer provides
information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)(1), it should consider providing such
information to accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws." Id.
72 See Steven Dresner & Brett Goetschius, The Players: Issuers, Investors, Agents and
Regulators, in PIPES: A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 65, 70
(rev. & updated ed. 2006).
" 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1) & 230.502(c) (2006).
74 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at § 3-C-6(b)(iv)(1). See also Robert T.
Willis, Jr., P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 34 at *2 (Jan. 18,
1988).
71 See E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2917 at *2
(Dec. 3, 1985).
76 Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 281 lat *2 (Dec. 4, 1985).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.503 & 239.500 (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a) (2006).
79 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(a)(3)(ii) & 230.502(d) (2006).
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generally sell the PIPE shares for at least one year from the closing of the
PIPE, unless the subsequent sale is registered with the SEC.80
2. Public Offering
As mentioned above, PIPE deals include a requirement that the
issuer file a registration statement with respect to the resale or secondary
offering of the PIPE shares. The issuer typically registers the resale on
Form S-3 under the Securities Act unless it does not meet the eligibility
requirements of the form. Form S-3 is an abbreviated registration form
which allows a public company to incorporate by reference the information
contained in its existing and future quarterly, annual and other reports it is
required to file with the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act").81 This means that a great deal of information about the
company is not actually set forth in the registration statement but instead
the registration statement contains a cross reference to the company's
Exchange Act reports.8 2  As a result of incorporation by reference,
frequently a Form S-3 prospectus will be quite short, containing only very
abbreviated financial and business disclosure about the issuer.
8 3
To be eligible to use Form S-3 for a secondary offering, among
other things, a company must have been a reporting company for at least
the previous year and have filed all Exchange Act reports timely during the
previous year. 84 Additionally, the company must (1) have securities of the
same class as those being registered "listed and registered on a national
securities exchange or ... quoted on the automated quotation system of a
national securities association;,, 85 or (2) have a common stock public float
of at least $75 million.86 Many PIPE issuers, however, fail to meet the first
requirement because their shares are listed on the OTC Bulletin Board or
'0 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1) & 230.502(d) (2006).
8! See CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 3.02[C] (4th ed. 2006).
82 See id.
83 See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of Task Force on Sellers'
Due Diligence and Similar Defenses Under the Federal Securities Laws, 48 Bus. LAW.
1185, 1219 n.153 (1992-1993). See also Johnson & McLaughlin, supra note 81, at §
3.02[C].84 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(3) (2006).85 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(3) (2006).
16 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (2006). See also DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE TELEPHONE
INTERPRETATIONS, SECURITIES ACT FORM S-3, at § H.56 (1997) [hereinafter, SEC
TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL], available at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml, which provides: "Issuers meeting the float
test in General Instruction I.B.1 of Form S-3 may make secondary offerings on Form S-
3, even though the securities to be issued are not listed on a national securities exchange
or quoted on an automated quotation system of a national securities association, as
required by General Instruction I.B.3."
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the Pink Sheets, and the SEC has stated that these markets do not fall within
the authorized exchanges or quotation systems8 7  Further, many PIPE
issuers do not have a sufficient public float to meet the second requirement.
If a company is ineligible to use Form S-3, it will have to register
the resale on Form S-1, or, if the company qualifies as a "small business
issuer,"" it may choose to use Form SB-2.89 Both of these forms are
considered full-blown registration statements, i.e., much more information
is actually set forth in the registration statement as compared to a
registration statement on Form S-3.90 The use of Form S-1 or SB-2 will
likely result in higher transaction costs for a PIPE issuer as compared to a
registration statement on Form S-3. Because these forms call for more
elaborate disclosure, they take more time and effort to prepare, which
results in higher professional fees. Additionally, the SEC is more likely to
review an S-1 or SB-2 registration statement, which would further delay
effectiveness. Hence, PIPE investors will likely demand an additional
discount or higher penalty to compensate them for (1) the fact that, as
compared to an S-3, it will take longer for the company to file the
registration statement, and (2) the greater risk that effectiveness will be
delayed by SEC review.
It should be noted that the resale registration statement for a PIPE
will be filed as a shelf registration statement under Securities Act Rule
415.91 Rule 415 allows a registration statement to cover sales that will be
made over a period of time.92  This will provide investors with the
87 See id. § H.54 ("For purposes of General Instruction I.B.3. of Form S-3, 'quoted on
the automated quotations system of a national securities association' includes listing on
the NASDAQ small cap market [predecessor of the NASDAQ Capital Market] and
listing on the NASDAQ National Market System [predecessor of the NASDAQ Global
Market], but does not include listing on the NASDAQ electronic bulletin board.")
" A small business issuer is any entity with revenue of less than $25 million during its
last fiscal year and a public float (shares held by non-affiliates of the entity) with a
market value of less than $25 million and that is not a foreign (other than Canadian)
private company, an investment company or a majority-owned subsidiary of a non-
small business company. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405 & 228.10(a) (2006).
89 Form SB-2 is less burdensome to comply with than Form S-1. Specifically, the
requirements with respect to financial statements are more easily met than are those for
Form S-1 and permit use of financial statements prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles, whereas Forms S-1 requires financial statements to be
prepared in accordance with the detailed requirements of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§
210.1-01 through 210.12-29 (2006).
90 It should be noted that since December 2005, Form S-1 has allowed certain issuers to
incorporate by reference information from their Exchange Act reports. See 70 Fed.
Reg. 44819 (Aug. 3, 2005). Many PIPE issuers, however, do not meet the eligibility
requirements to use incorporation by reference because during the last three years it was
either a blank check company, a shell company, or registered a penny stock offering.
See Form S-1, Gen. Instr. VII.
91 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2006).
92 See Johnson & McLaughlin, supra note 81, at § 8.01.
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flexibility to sell their PIPE shares into the market over an extended period
of time. Generally for a PIPE shares registration statement to qualify under
Rule 415, the registration statement must pertain only to "[s]ecurities which
are to be offered or sold solely by or on behalf of a person or persons other
than the registrant, a subsidiary of the registrant or a person of which the
registrant is a subsidiary. 93
3. Integration
Under the concept of integration, two or more offerings which an
issuer structured as separate exempt offerings may be "integrated" or
treated by the SEC as one larger offering for which no exemption is
available.94 Integration is generally intended to prevent an issuer from
circumventing the registration requirements of the Securities Act by
structuring a large offering for which no exemption is available as two or
more smaller exempt offerings. 95  If the SEC integrates a series of
apparently exempt offerings, the integrated offering must qualify for an
96
exemption. If it does not, since by definition the integrated offering was
not registered, all sales in connection therewith will have been made in
violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act 97 resulting in, among other
things, each purchaser in the offering having a right to rescind the
transaction.98
Integration is relevant to a PIPE deal because the deal involves a
private placement followed shortly thereafter by a public offering. If these
two offerings were integrated and treated as one larger offering, the issuer
would be in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.99 Rule 506 would
not exempt the larger offering because the public offering component
involved general solicitation. 10 The registration statement does not save a
violation because it covers the resale of the underlying securities by the
PIPE investors and not the issuance of the PIPE securities to the investors.
Hence, the integrated offering is neither fully registered nor exempt, and
therefore violates section 5.
Fortunately for the PIPE issuers, integration issues are easy to
manage because of Securities Act Rule 152.0 Rule 152 dates back to 1935
93 Id. See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(i) (2006).
94 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at § 3-C-1.
9' 1d; Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Qfferings: A Proposed Formula
that Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 209 (1994).96 1d at 200.
97 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (2006).
99 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at § 3-C-1.
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2006).
101 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2006). See also Verticom Inc. No-Action Letter, 1986 WL
65214 (SEC states that a completed private placement would not be integrated with a
contemplated registered public offering not because of the five integration factors but
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and "makes clear that offerings made prior to the filing of the registration
statement and made under circumstances which did not necessitate
registration or contemplate registration, do not by the fact of registration
become the type of offerings which are prohibited by the Securities Act.
10 2
Under SEC interpretations of the rule, as long as the private offering is
completed prior to the filing of the registration statement for the secondary
offering, the offerings will not be integrated even if the registration
statement is filed shortly after closing of the private placement.
10 3
In fact, SEC interpretations allow an issuer to file a resale
registration statement before closing the related private offering without
integration concerns, provided the private offering meets each of the
following three conditions:
1. The private offering investors are "irrevocably bound to
purchase a set number of securities for a set purchase price that is
not based on market price or a fluctuating ratio, either at the time of
effectiveness of the resale registration statement or at any
subsequent date."
10 4
2. There are "no conditions to closing that are within an investor's
control or that an investor can cause not to be satisfied."'
0 5
Examples of prohibited closing conditions include those "relating
to the market price of the company's securities or the investor's
satisfactory completion of its due diligence on the company ....
3. "The closing of the private placement of the unissued securities
must occur within a short time after the effectiveness of the resale
registration statement."10' 7
Hence, it is possible to structure a PIPE so that the PIPE investors'
obligations to close on the private placement are conditional on the
effectiveness of the resale registration statement for the underlying common
instead because "under Rule 152 the filing of a registration statement following an
offering otherwise exempt under Section 4(2) does not vitiate the exemption under
Section 4(2).").
102 Securities Act Release No. 305, 1935 WL 28674 (Mar. 2, 1935). The rule provides:
"the phrase 'transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering' used in Section
4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public offering at the
time of said transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a
public offering and/or files a registration statement." 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2006).
0'3 See Vulture Petroleum Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,1987 WL 107524 (Feb. 2,
1987). See also SEC TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 86 (3d Supp.
Mar. 1999), at § 3S(a).
104 Id. at §35b.
105 id.
106 Id.
107 id.
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stock; having the SEC declare a resale registration statement effective is
considered outside the control of the PIPE investors.10 8
B. State Securities Laws
As a general matter, anyone offering or selling securities must also
comply with the securities laws of the states in which they are making the
offers and sales, all of which, except for the state of New York, require
registration of the offering with state regulators unless the offering falls
within an exemption therefrom.10 9 In 1996, however, Congress passed the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act ("NSMIA").'' ° NSMIA,
among other things, amended Section 18 of the Securities Act to provide
that no state law, rule, regulation, or order "requiring, or with respect to,
registration or qualification of securities, or registration or qualification of
securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly apply to a security that is
a covered security . . . ." ' The definition of a covered security includes a
security issued pursuant to Rule 506112 so blue sky compliance is a non-
issue for the private placement component of a PIPE.
Similarly, blue sky compliance is generally a non-issue for the
public offering component as well. There would be no violation because
most states exempt from their registration requirements secondary resales
of securities if the issuer has been subject to the reporting requirements
under the Exchange Act for at least 90 days.
1 3
C. NASDAQ Rules
Companies listed on NASDAQ are required to comply with the
NASDAQ Marketplace Rules or face delisting.'14  Several of these rules
may be implicated by a PIPE transaction, especially a transaction involving
structured PIPE securities (what NASDAQ refers to as "Future Priced
Securities").' ' 5 In particular, Rule 4350(i)(1)(D) provides in part:
108 DENNIS T. RICE & CHARLES P. ORTMEYER, SECURITIES REGULATION FORMS
§ 14:94 B (2007), available at SECREGFRM S 14:94 (Westlaw).
109 Loss & Seligman, supra note 59, at § l-B-4.
I10 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290,
110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See generally Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at § 1-B-3.
111 5 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (2006).
112 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006) (Rule 506 was issued by the SEC under section
4(2)). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)) (2006).
113 See Unif. Securities Act § 402(2) (1985).
14 See NASDAQ, Inc., Manual §§ 4000-7000 (2006), available at
http://nasdaq.complinet.com/nasdaq/display/index.html [hereinafter NASDAQ
Manual].
115 Id. at IM-4350-1. It should be noted that the NYSE and AMEX likewise have rules
implicated by PIPE transactions. See Tanenbaum & Pinedo, supra note 10, at 113-14.
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Each issuer shall require shareholder approval prior to the
issuance of securities in connection with a transaction other
than a public offering involving the sale, issuance or
potential issuance by the issuer of common stock (or
securities convertible into or exercisable for common
stock) at a price less than the greater of book or market
value which together with sales by officers, directors or
substantial shareholders of the company equals 20% or
more of the common stock or 20% or more of the voting
power outstanding before the issuance." 
6
With a structured PIPE, the number of shares to be issued in the
future is indeterminate because it depends on the market price at the time of
conversion. As a result, in applying the above rule, NASDAQ looks to "the
maximum potential issuance of common shares at the time the Future
Priced Security is issued."'1 7 For some structured PIPES (the "death spiral"
variety), the issuance of the PIPE security without shareholder approval
will likely violate Rule 4350(i)(1)(D). There would be a violation because
in applying the 20% threshold NASDAQ will use a conversion price of one
cent given that the market price of the company's common stock, and
therefore the PIPE security conversion price, could potentially drop that
low.
118
An issuer can include features in its structured PIPE to avoid
triggering the shareholder approval requirement of Rule 4350(i)(1)(D). For
example, the number of shares of common stock issuable upon conversion
could be capped at 20% or less,11 9 "such that there cannot, under any
circumstances, be an issuance of 20% or more of the common stock or
voting power previously outstanding without prior shareholder
Few PIPE issuers, however, have securities listed on these exchanges. Thus, this article
does not discuss NYSE and AMEX rules.
116 Id. at R. 4350(i)(1)(D) (2006). Note that "NASDAQ may make exceptions to this
requirement when the delay in securing stockholder approval would seriously
jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and reliance by the company on this
exception is expressly approved by the Audit Committee or a comparable body of the
Board ofDirectors." Id., IM-4350-1, at n. 1.
117 NASDAQ Manual, supra note 114 at IM-4350-1.
118 As NASDAQ put it: "Typically, with a Future Priced Security, the maximum
potential issuance will exceed 20 percent of the common stock outstanding because the
Future Priced Security could, potentially, be converted into common stock based on a
share price of one cent per share, or less. Further, for purposes of this calculation, the
lowest possible conversion price is below the book or market value of the stock at the
time of issuance of the Future Priced Security. Therefore, shareholder approval must be
obtained prior to the issuance of the Future Priced Security. Issuers should also be
cautioned that obtaining shareholder ratification of the transaction after the issuance of
a Future Priced Security does not satisfy the shareholder approval requirements." Id.
''9 See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 114.
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approval.',20 Additionally, a floor could be placed on the conversion price
at the greater of book or market value of the company's common stock on
the issuance date of the PIPE security. 121 NASDAQ warns, however, that
even if a structured PIPE contains these features "shareholder approval is
still required under Rule 4350(i)(1)(B) 122 if the issuance will result in a
change of control.
1 23
A PIPE issuance may also implicate NASDAQ Rule 4351 which
provides: "Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded
common stock registered under Section 12 of the [Exchange] Act cannot be
disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or
issuance."' 124 NASDAQ interprets this provision to mean that "an issuer
cannot create a new class of security that votes at a higher rate than an
existing class of securities or take any other action that has the effect of
120 NASDAQ Manual, supra note 114, at IM-4350-2. With respect to such a cap,
NASDAQ notes: "If an issuer determines to defer a shareholder vote in this manner,
shares that are issuable under the cap (in the first part of the transaction) must not be
entitled to vote to approve the remainder of the transaction. In addition, a cap must
apply for the life of the transaction, unless shareholder approval is obtained. For
example, caps that no longer apply if a company is not listed on NASDAQ are not
permissible under the Rule. Of course, if shareholder approval is not obtained, then the
investor will not be able to acquire 20% or more of the common stock or voting power
outstanding before the transaction and would continue to hold the balance of the
original security in its unconverted form.
NASDAQ has observed situations where issuers have attempted to cap the issuance of
shares at below 20% but have also provided an alternative outcome based upon whether
shareholder approval is obtained, such as a "penalty" or a "sweetener." For example, a
company issues a convertible preferred stock or debt instrument that provides for
conversions of up to 20% of the total shares outstanding with any further conversions
subject to shareholder approval. However, the terms of the instrument provide that if
shareholders reject the transaction, the coupon or conversion ratio will increase or the
issuer will be penalized by a specified monetary payment. Likewise, a transaction may
provide for improved terms if shareholder approval is obtained. NASDAQ believes that
in such situations the cap is defective because the related penalty or sweetener has a
coercive effect on the shareholder vote, and thus may deprive shareholders of their
ability to freely exercise their vote. Accordingly, NASDAQ will not accept a cap that
defers the need for shareholder approval in such situations. Instead, if the terms of a
transaction can change based upon the outcome of the shareholder vote, no shares may
be issued prior to the approval of the shareholders. Issuers that engage in transactions
with defective caps may be subject to delisting." Id.
121 NASDAQ Manual, supra note 115, IM-4350-1.
122 NASDAQ Manual R. 4350(i)(1)(B) requires shareholder approval of a securities
issuance "when the issuance or potential issuance will result in a change of control of
the issuer." Id., R. 4350(i)(1)(B). For a discussion of the definition of "change of
control" as used in the rule, see Deborah A. Marshall & Julia Vax, NASDAQ
Compliance Issues in PIPE Transactions, 35TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION, at 144-45 (PLI Corporate Law Practice, Course Handbook Series No.
B0-01PG, 2003) (Westlaw 1396 PLI/Corp 133).
123 NASDAQ Manual, supra note 114, IM-4350-1.
124 Id., R. 4351.
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restricting or reducing the voting rights of an existing class of securities." '25
NASDAQ notes that structured PIPE securities implicate the provision
when they allow holders to vote on an as-converted basis or elect members
of the board of directors. 126 In particular:
[NASDAQ] will consider whether a voting rights violation
exists by comparing the Future Priced Security holders'
voting rights to their relative contribution to the company
based on the company's overall book or market value at the
time of the issuance of the Future Priced Security. The
percentage of the overall vote attributable to the Future
Priced Security holders and the Future Priced Security
holders' representation on the board of directors must not
exceed their relative contribution to the company based on
the company's overall book or market value at the time of
the issuance of the Future Priced Security. If the voting
power or the board percentage exceeds that percentage
interest, a violation exists because a new class of securities
has been created that votes at a higher rate than an already
existing class. Future Priced Securities that vote on an as-
converted basis also raise voting rights concerns because of
the possibility that, due to a decline in the price of the
underlying common stock, the Future Priced Security
holder will have voting rights disproportionate to its
investment in the Company. 127
It is obvious that NASDAQ generally disapproves of death spiral PIPEs and
therefore has interpreted its rules accordingly.
IV. RECENT SEC PIPE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Considering the popularity of PIPE investments among hedge
funds, some of which routinely push the legal envelope with their trading
strategies, it is not surprising that the SEC has uncovered a number of PIPE
investors that have engaged in some questionable practices. In the last two
years, the SEC has brought at least eleven enforcement actions relating to
PIPE deals.1 28 Most of these actions involve claims that the defendants
engaged in insider trading and/or violated Section 5 of the Securities Act.
125 Id., IR-4350-1 at *2.
126 See id
127 Id. NASDAQ notes that shareholder approval of an issuance does not affect
compliance with the voting rights rule.
128 Complaint, SEC v. Zehil, No. 07cv1439 (S.D.N.Y. Filed Feb. 28, 2007) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp2OO2l.pdf; Complaint, Spiegel,
supra note 55; Complaint, SEC v. Friedman, No. 06-cv-02160 (D.D.C. filed Dec. 20,
2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp 19950.pdf;
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A. Insider Trading
The SEC has leveled insider trading allegations against defendants
that sold short shares of PIPE issuers in the open market prior to public
disclosure of the PIPE financing. 129 Under the misappropriation theory of
insider trading, a person violates Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 1 Ob-5 thereunder "when he misappropriates confidential information
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information."' 130  To prevail on an insider trading claim under the
misappropriation theory, the SEC must prove that the defendant traded on
material, non-public information in breach of a duty of trust or confidence
owed by the defendant to the information source. 131
Information is considered material with respect to insider trading if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in making an investment decision. 32 Put differently, "there must
be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the [information] would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
Complaint, SEC v. Margan, No. 06-0531 (W.D.N.C. filed Dec. 28, 2006) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp 19955.pdf; In re Dreyer, SEC
Order, Securities Act Release No. 8761, Exchange Act Release No. 54972 (Dec. 20,
2006) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8761 .pdf; In re Spinner
Asset Management, LLC, SEC Order, Securities Act Release No. 8763, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2573 (Dec. 20, 2006) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8763.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Lyon,
(S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 12, 2006) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19942.pdf; Complaint, SEC v.
Deephaven Capital Management, LLC, No. 1:06CV00805 (D.D.C. filed May 2, 2006)
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/compi 9683.pdf; Complaint,
SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., No. 1:06CV00467 (D.D.C. filed March 14, 2006)
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compi 9607.pdf; Complaint, SEC
v. Shane, No. 05-CV-4772 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 2005) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp 19227.pdf; Complaint, SEC v. Pollet,
No. 05-CV-1937 (E.D.N.Y. filed April 21, 2005) available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007 /comp 19984.pdf.
129 See, e.g., Complaint, Friedman, supra note 121, at 2; Complaint, Mangan, supra
note 128, at 1; Complaint, Lyon, supra note 128, at 6; Complaint, Langley Partners,
supra note 128, at 3; Complaint, Deephaven, supra note 128, at 1; Complaint, Shane,
supra note 128, at 1; Complaint, Pollet, supra note 128, at 2.
130 U.S. v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
"' Id. at 656.
132 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote."). TSC technically established the definition of
"material fact" for purposes of Section 14a-9 of the Exchange Act which applies to
misstatements or omissions in proxy solicitation materials. The Supreme Court
subsequently adopted the same standard for Section 10 and Rule lob-5. Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988).
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the 'total mix' of information made available.1 3 3  Making a materiality
determination is a fact intensive inquiry that "requires delicate assessments
of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of
facts and the significance of those inferences to him, and these assessments
are peculiarly ones for the trier of fact., 134 Note that in a 2000 release, the
SEC specifically listed "private sales of additional securities" as an event
"that should be reviewed carefully to determine whether [it is] material. 135
A duty of trust or confidence is deemed to arise from any fiduciary
or fiduciary like relationship such as an employer/employee, attorney/client,
and doctor/patient relationship. 136 Outside of this context, Rule 1 0(b)(5)-2
under the Exchange Act is relevant.1 37 Rule 10(b)(5)-2 "provides a non-
exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust
or confidence for purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of insider
trading. '1 38 Among other things, the rule provides that a duty of trust or
confidence exists "[w]henever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence."'
139
The December 12, 2006 complaint filed by the SEC in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Edwin
Buchanan Lyon, IV, Gryphon Master Fund, L.P., and related entities
provides a good example of the application of the misappropriation theory
in the context of PIPE deals. According to the complaint, defendants
engaged in illegal insider trading by selling short the securities of four PIPE
issuers prior to the public announcements of their PIPE offerings. 140 The
SEC alleged that information concerning the four PIPE offerings was
material because "the announcement typically precipitates a decline in the
price of a PIPE issuer's securities due to the dilutive effect of the offering
and the PIPE shares being issued at a discount to the then prevailing market
price of the issuer's stock. 1 41 Hence, "[a] reasonable investor would have
considered information concerning each of the four PIPEs - including the
date of the PIPE offering, the discounted price of the stock, and the number
of shares issued - important to his or her investment decision and a
133 TSC Indus., supra note 132, at 449.
134 Id. at 450. See also Basic, supra note 132, at 236.135 Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, SEC Release No. 34-43154, 2000 WL
1201556 at *10 (Aug. 15, 2000).
136 See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
PREVENTION § 6.6 (2006).
137 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2006).
138 Id. Preliminary Note.
139 Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
140 Complaint, Lyon, supra note 128, at 15.
141 ,
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significant alteration of the total mix of information available to the
public."' 42
The SEC alleged that the defendants owed a duty of trust or
confidence to the PIPE issuers because defendants "received offering
documents with language requiring them to maintain the information
contained therein in confidence and/or to refrain from trading prior to the
public announcement of the offering., 143 Hence, the SEC appears to be
asserting that the defendants agreed to keep information concerning the
impending PIPE deals in confidence, and therefore, the requisite duty of
trust or confidence is established under Rule 10(b)(5)-2 1 44  The SEC
alleged that defendants breached this duty when they sold short the issuers'
securities prior to each of the four PIPE deals being publicly announced. 
4 5
B. Section 5 Violations
Section 5 of the Securities Act requires that every offer and sale of
a security be registered with the SEC, 14 6 although a number of exemptions
from registration are available.1' The SEC has recently asserted Section 5
violations against several PIPE investors. The factual basis is functionally
the same in all these cases, and SEC v. Joseph J. Spiegel provides a
representative example. 4 8 Spiegel was the portfolio manager for a hedge
fund that invested in several PIPE deals. 149 In three of these deals, Spiegel
hedged the fund's PIPE investment by selling short the PIPE issuers'
securities before the resale registration statements for the PIPE shares were
142 Id. at 15-16. The SEC makes similar assertions concerning materiality in the
Friedman complaint (at] 3), the Mangan complaint (at 8-9), the Deephaven complaint
(at 4), and the Shane complaint (at 7).
143 Complaint, Lyon, supra note 128, at 16.
144 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1) (2006). The SEC makes similar assertions
concerning the duty of trust or confidence in the Deephaven complaint (see p. 4), and
the Shane complaint (see p. 9). In the Deephaven complaint, the SEC also attributes a
duty of trust or confidence to Deephaven because of a "pattern or practice" presumably
as contemplated by Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) which provides as follows:
[A] "duty of trust or confidence" exists in the following circumstances, among
others: Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic
information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history,
pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the
information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating
the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its
confidentiality. § 240.1 0b5-2(b)(2) (2006).
145 See id at 18.
146 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
141 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006).
148 See Complaint, Spiegel, supra note 59.
149 id. at 1.
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declared effective. 15  Spiegel then covered some or all of these short sales
with PIPE shares.'
51
The SEC views the short sales as Section 5 violations "because
shares used to cover a short sale are deemed to have been sold when the
short sale was made., 152 Hence, Spiegel, in effect, sold the PIPE shares
into the market before registration statements for these sales were declared
effective, thus violating Section 5.
The reason this constitutes a violation of Section 5 is somewhat
convoluted. To begin with, the PIPE shares were issued in a transaction not
involving a public offering and were therefore "restricted."' 153 Restricted
securities can be sold only if registered with the SEC or an exemption from
registration is available. Typically, resales of securities are exempt from
registration under Section 4(1) of the Securities Act.154  Section 4(1)
exempts from registration "transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter, or dealer. 1 55 In the SEC's view, however, Section 4(1) is not
available to Spiegel because he is an underwriter. Section 2(a)(1 1) of the
Securities Act defines the term "underwriter", among other things, as "any
person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to ... the distribution
of any security."'' 56 Under SEC interpretations, anyone who sells restricted
securities is presumed to be an underwriter unless the sale is made in
compliance with Securities Act Rule 144. Rule 144 sets forth conditions
under which a person who sells restricted securities "shall be deemed not to
be engaged in a distribution of such securities and therefore not to be an
underwriter thereof within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1 1) of the
[Securities] Act."' 57 Because Spiegel, in effect, sold the restricted shares
(the PIPE shares) in an unregistered transaction and out of compliance with
Rule 144, he is presumed to be an underwriter. Hence, Section 4(1) does
not exempt the sales and neither does any other exemption. Thus, Spiegel
violated Section 5 because the sales were neither registered nor exempt. 58
150 Id. at2.
151 Id. at 4.
152 id.
153 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3)(i) (2006).
154 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2006).
155 id.
156 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(ll) (2006).
157 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (2006).
158 Based on a similar line of reasoning, the SEC also alleged that Spiegel violated
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule IOb-5 thereunder which prohibits
misrepresentations in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Specifically,
the SEC alleged that Spiegel signed several PIPE purchase agreements that included
representations that the hedge fund was purchasing the shares for its own account and
without the present intent to distribute the securities (this is a standard representation
required of an investor in a private placement because it is essentially required for the
issuances to be exempt from registration under Section 4(2) and Rule 506 of the
Securities Act). The SEC's positions is that this constituted a misrepresentation
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This line of reasoning rests on characterizing Spiegel's pre-
effectiveness short sales as sales of PIPE shares. Such a characterization
makes sense in Spiegel's case because he allegedly "executed 'naked' short
sales by, among other things, selling short without borrowing unrestricted
shares to deliver. ' 1 9 However, the analysis would be the same even if
Spiegel had borrowed unrestricted shares to sell short. The SEC has long
taken the position that a short sale cannot be covered with securities that
were restricted on the date of the short sale. 6 '
It should be noted that a PIPE investor can sell short a PIPE
issuer's securities before effectiveness of the resale registration so long as
the short position is covered with shares purchased in the open market. 161
As the SEC stated in a recent order from an administrative proceeding:
Many PIPE investors 'hedge' their investment by selling
short the PIPE issuer's securities before the resale
registration statement is declared effective. There is
because "Spiegel signed these securities purchase agreements despite knowing or
recklessly not knowing that the hedge fund.., had a present intention to distribute the
PIPE securities through its short selling and to cover the PIPE shares in violation of
Section." Complaint, Spiegel, supra note 59, at 8.
159 Id. at 6.
60 See Resales of Restricted and Other Securities, Release No. 6099,
1979 WL 174360 at *29 (Aug. 2, 1979), which provides:
(82) Question: Will a non-affiliate who sells securities short without
placing his restricted securities "in the box" and later uses the
restricted securities to cover the short position be able to rely on
Rule 144 if he complies with its requirements only at the time the
short position is covered?
Answer: No. It is necessary that the initial sales transaction comply
with Rule 144. The purpose of this prohibition is to preclude a non-
affiliate from avoiding the requirements of Rule 144(f) and (g) by
effecting a short sale without complying with those sections and
thereafter covering his short position with restricted securities.
This position was reaffirmed in Revision of Rule 144, Rule 145 and Form 144, Release
No. 33-7391, 1997 WL 70601, at fn. 59 (Feb. 20, 1997). It is also consistent with the
SEC's telephone interpretation manual which provides:
An issuer filed a Form S-3 registration statement for a secondary
offering of common stock which is not yet effective. One of the
selling shareholders wanted to do a short sale of common stock
"against the box" and cover the short sale with registered shares after
the effective date. The issuer was advised that the short sale could
not be made before the registration statement becomes effective,
because the shares underlying the short sale are deemed to be sold at
the time such sale is made. There would, therefore, be a violation of
Section 5 if the shares were effectively sold prior to the effective
date. SEC TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 86,
(Securities Act Sections, Jul. 1997) at § 65.
161 See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC
CORPORATION § 6.31 (2006).
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nothing per se illegal about 'hedging' a PIPE investment by
selling short the issuer's securities. Such short sales do not
violate the registration provisions of the Securities Act if,
among other things, the investor closes out the short
position with shares purchased in the open market. 162
In this situation, the investor would still be viewed as selling the shares it
used to cover the short position into the market on the date it effected the
short sale. However, because these shares were purchased in the open
market and are therefore unrestricted, the investor will not have violated
Section 5; the sales will be exempt under Section 4(1) because the investor
will not be considered an underwriter.
The SEC's position may make sense conceptually. It does not,
however, appear to further the policy behind Section 5. The policy behind
Section 5 is "to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce' ' 163 so
that they can make informed investment decisions. To that end, Section 5
generally requires that all public offerings of securities be registered with
the SEC and that each investor in the offering be furnished a prospectus.
64
Whether a PIPE investor covers short sales with PIPE shares or open
market purchases has no impact on an issuer's disclosure obligations.
Disclosure regarding the resale of PIPE shares will be set forth in the resale
registration statement, and this disclosure will be the same regardless of the
type of shares used by a PIPE investor to cover a short position.
In the PIPE context, the SEC's position is apparently based on the
fact that allowing a PIPE investor to sell short an issuer's stock and then
later cover the short position with PIPE shares would enable PIPE investors
"to invest in PIPE offerings without incurring market risk., 165 There are at
least two problems with this justification. First, Section 5 is about ensuring
disclosure, not preventing investors from avoiding market risk. Second, the
SEC allows PIPE investors to avoid market risk by short selling so long as
the short position is covered by shares purchased in the open market. If the
issue really is about market risk, shouldn't the SEC interpret Section 5 to
prohibit this as well?
It should be noted that Rule 105 of Regulation M under the
Exchange Act does prohibit an investor from selling shares short within
five business days of the pricing of a firm commitment public offering and
then covering the short sales with shares purchased in the public offering.
1 66
162 Order, Spinner, supra note 128, at 2-3.
163 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) citing H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). See also Loss & Seligman, supra note 64, at § 1-H-6.
164 See Loss & Seligman, supra note 59, at § 2-B-i a.
165 Id. at 5.
161 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.242.105 (2006). See also In re Imperium Advisors, LLC, at 2,
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-55483.pdf.
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This prohibition, however, is not based on Section 5 but on the antifraud
and anti-manipulation provisions of the securities laws. 16 7 Regardless, the
prohibition does not apply to PIPE related transactions because they do not
involve firm commitment underwritings.
At any rate, by prohibiting a PIPE investor from covering a short
position with PIPE shares, the SEC is not ensuring that PIPE investors are
subject to market risk. What it is ensuring is that the investors will be
subject to increased unwinding risk. Unwinding risk is the risk that it will
be difficult or expensive to unwind or closeout a hedged position.
Unwinding risk is minimal if a PIPE investor can use PIPE shares to close
out its position. It simply delivers the PIPE shares to cover the short
position once the resale registration statement for the PIPE shares is
declared effective. Since the SEC does not allow this, the investor will
instead need to have a broker execute a sale order for the PIPE shares and a
buy order for market shares. Hence, the PIPE investor will have to pay a
brokerage commission on each order and will also likely lose money on the
bid/ask spread.
This assumes that the orders can be executed simultaneously.
Simultaneous execution, however, will be difficult with respect to the
shares of many PIPE issuers because their stocks are thinly traded.1 68
Hence, PIPE investors also have to bear the risk of potential adverse price
movement following execution of one order but before execution of the
other, and the thinner the market for a PIPE issuer's shares, the greater the
risk. The end result is that PIPE issuers will have to compensate investors
for this unwinding risk through a greater market discount, increased warrant
coverage, etc. Alternatively, PIPE investors may insist on a floating PIPE
deal because the repricing mechanism would provide a built-in hedge
thereby reducing unwinding risk (PIPE investors will be hedged against
market risk without having to engage in short selling).
V. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND THE SEC's RESPONSE
Hedge funds are able to reap positive abnormal risk adjusted
returns from investing in PIPEs in part because they are engaging in
regulatory arbitrage. This becomes apparent when a PIPE transaction is
compared to an underwritten, firm-commitment, follow-on public offering
of common stock (seasoned equity offering or "SEO" for short).
A. PIPE vs. Seasoned Equity Offering
167 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.100(a) (2006).
168 See Chaplinsley & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 18 ("By all accounts, the shares of
PIPE issuers are far less liquid than the typical firm.").
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In an SEO, an issuer sells shares of common stock at a market
discount to a syndicate of underwriters. The syndicate then promptly
resells the shares to the public. In a typical PIPE transaction, an issuer sells
common stock or securities convertible into common stock at a market
discount to a "syndicate" of hedge funds. The "syndicate" then promptly
resells the PIPE shares to the public, either directly, if the closing is
conditional on the effectiveness of the resale registration, or, if not,
indirectly through short sales.
The regulatory implications for the underwriters of a follow-on
public offering as compared to those for investors in a PIPE, however, are
much different. For example, Regulation M under the Exchange Act places
a whole host of trading restrictions on underwriters at specified times
during the public offering. 169 Regulation M generally has no application to
PIPE investors. Further, the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (NASD), the self regulatory organization of which virtually every
investment banking firm in the United States is a member and hence subject
to its rules, regulates public offering underwriting compensation.170
Specifically, NASD Rule 2710 provides "no member or person
associated with a member shall receive an amount of underwriting
compensation in connection with a public offering which is unfair or
unreasonable.1 7 1 Under the rule, an underwriter is required to make certain
filings with the NASD specifying the underwriter's proposed
compensation. 7 2  The NASD then adds up all "items of value" to be
received by the underwriters in connection with the offering including
discounts, commissions, expense reimbursements, and warrants173 and then
notifies the underwriters as to whether it finds the proposed compensation
unfair or unreasonable. The NASD presumably uses a multi-factored
formula to make the determination but refuses to provide the specific
formula out of concern that doing so "would tend to encourage members to
charge issuers the maximum compensation allowed ... ,,.
The NASD has indicated that the gross dollar amount, type of
underwriting (firm commitment/best efforts), and type of offering (initial/
follow-on) are relevant to the calculation.17 5 In a 1992 Notice to Members,
169 See JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 81, at § 4.02.
170 See NASD Conduct Rule 2710. See also JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 81,
at 6-9.
171 NASD Conduct Rule 2710(c)(2)(A).
172 Id. Rule 2710(b).
171 Id. Rule 2710(c)(3).
174 Exchange Act Release No. 30,587 (Apr. 15, 1992), 1992 WL 81746, at *7.
175 A 1992 NASD Notice to Members provides:
In determining the maximum amount of compensation that is
considered fair and reasonable, the NASD considers the size of the
offering and the amount of risk assumed by the underwriter, which
is determined by whether the offering is being underwritten on a
firm commitment or best efforts basis and whether the offering is an
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the NASD indicated that "generally accepted levels of underwriting
compensation" for a firm commitment follow-on offering as a percentage of
gross dollar amount of the offering was 14.57% for a $1 million deal,
10.72% for a $5 million deal, and 8.18% for a $10 million deal.1'6 A PIPE
deal does not fall within the ambit of Rule 2710. Thus, there are no
restrictions on the "compensation" hedge funds can receive for doing the
deal. As mentioned above, the "All-in" discount for PIPE deals ranges
from 14.3% to 34.7%, well above the maximum the NASD would allow an
underwriter to charge for a follow-on public offering.'
7
Additionally, underwriters face potential liability under Section 11
of the Securities Act for material misstatements in, or omissions from,
registration statements of offerings they underwrite, subject to the due
diligence defense. 17 8 Hence, a standard part of an SEO is a due diligence
investigation of the issuer by the lead underwriter and its counsel.1 79 Not
only is this investigation necessary to preserve the due diligence defense,
but it is necessary to protect the underwriters reputational capital. By
bringing an offering to the market, an underwriter implicitly certifies the
legitimacy of the offering to the marketplace.'8 0 If it turns out that the
certification was misplaced, the underwriter's reputational capital will take
a hit. Therefore, an underwriter will not proceed with a deal if the
investigation uncovers major problems with the issuer. Conversely, a
hedge fund generally does not face potential liability under Section 11
initial or secondary offering. The maximum guideline amount
generally will vary directly with the amount of risk assumed by the
underwriter and inversely with the dollar amount of offering
proceeds. Firm commitment offerings are permitted higher levels of
compensation than best efforts offerings due to the risk involved in
an underwriter purchasing the securities for resale versus simply
utilizing its best efforts to place the securities for the issuer. In
addition, a firm commitment initial public offering (IPO) is
generally permitted higher compensation than a firm commitment
secondary offering because the underwriter is dealing with an
unseasoned issuer and is likely to incur higher costs in introducing
the issuer to prospective underwriters and investors. The higher
percentage levels of compensation permitted in smaller offerings
recognizes that certain fixed costs are involved in any distribution,
regardless of size.NASD Notice to Members 92-53 (1992),
available at
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid- 189&el
ement id- 1159000407.
176 id.
177 See Chaplinsky & Haushalter, supra note 4, at 3.
178 See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2006).
179See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Diligence Defense Under Section II
of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 555 (2006).
180 John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1220-21 (1997).
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when investing in a PIPE deal nor is its investment in a deal viewed as an
implicit certification of the issuer. Hence, it can get away with performing
minimal due diligence.
The bottom line is that hedge funds are engaging in regulatory
arbitrage when they invest in PIPE deals. They are in essence underwriting
SEOs but avoiding many of the regulations applicable to traditional
underwriters. Hence, they can sell short stock in PIPE issuers at anytime
during the "distribution," they can charge as much in "compensation" as the
PIPE issuer is willing to pay, and they can choose to perform minimal due
diligence. Further, they do not have to compete for deals against SEO
underwriters. Virtually no investment banking firms underwrite SEOs for
small companies. The economics simply do not make sense for them to do
so in large part because the NASD cap on underwriting compensation is too
low. Underwriters are not able to charge enough to make up for the small
deal size, heightened liability, and reputational concerns associated with
small company offerings. Therefore, they do not do them.
B. SEC Response
This regulatory arbitrage has not gone unnoticed by the SEC. In
particular, the SEC has recently taken the position that some PIPE investors
may, in fact, be underwriters. Specifically, the SEC now generally views a
resale registration statement with respect to 33% or more of a PIPE issuer's
'public float"181 as a primary as opposed to a secondary offering.18 2 Thus,
181 "Pubic float" means shares held by non-affiliates of the issuer. See
lnvestorWords.com, Public Float Definition,
http://www.investorwords.com/3936/publicfloat.html (last visited August 26, 2007).
182 See Sargent, supra note 44, at 13; Judith Burns, SEC Slows Flow of PIPE Deals to a
Trickle, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2006, at Cl. An SEC Telephone Interpretations Manual
provision issued in 1997 provides the following with respect to the primary/secondary
offering issue:
It is important to identify whether a purported secondary offering is
really a primary offering, i.e., the selling shareholders are actually
underwriters selling on behalf of an issuer. Underwriter status may
involve additional disclosure, including an acknowledgment of the
seller's prospectus delivery requirements. In an offering involving
Rule 415 or Form S-3, if the offering is deemed to be on behalf of
the issuer, the Rule and Form in some cases will be unavailable (e.g.,
because of the Form S-3 "public float" test for a primary offering, or
because Rule 415 (a)(1)(i) is available for secondary offerings, but
primary offerings must meet the requirements of one of the other
subsections of Rule 415). The question of whether an offering styled
a secondary one is really on behalf of the issuer is a difficult factual
one, not merely a question of who receives the proceeds.
Consideration should be given to how long the selling shareholders
have held the shares, the circumstances under which they received
them, their relationship to the issuer, the amount of shares involved,
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investors listed in such a resale registration statement are considered
underwriters and therefore subject to Section 11 liability.18 3
It is not clear where the 33% number comes from. Historically,
PIPE issuers routinely registered for resale on shelf registration statements a
number of PIPE shares equal to many times their public floats.' 84 This
practice was implicitly endorsed by the SEC because it had reviewed and
signed off on many of these registration statements. In April 2006,
however, the SEC began refusing to declare effective secondary registration
statements for PIPE shares in excess of 33% of an issuer's public float,
casting a cloud over the PIPE market.18 5 It communicated its position not
through a formal interpretive release or rulemaking, but on an ad hoc basis
through individual comment letters. 1
8 6
In late January of this year, the SEC did remove some uncertainty
concerning the primary/secondary offering issue. Curiously, it did not do
so through any official channel, but instead through a speech delivered by
David Lynn, the SEC's Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporate
Finance, at the annual PIPE conference held in New York City on January
26, 2007.187 Hence, the exact policy justification for the reinterpretation
whether the sellers are in the business of underwriting securities, and
finally, whether under all the circumstances it appears that the seller
is acting as a conduit for the issuer. SEC TELEPHONE
INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 86 (Securities Act R. 415,
Jul. 1997) at § 29.
183 In such a situation, PIPE investors would fall under the definition of underwriter
because they would be participating in a "distribution" of securities. See 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1 1) (2006).
184 See Burns, supra note 182.
185 See Sargent, supra note 44, at 13; Burns, supra note 182.
186 See Sey-Hyo Lee, Kevin C. Smith, Ruslan Koretski, PIPEs Clogged, MONDAQ Bus.
BRIEFING, (Mar. 12, 2007) available at:
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid-46040 (Last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
187 Greenberg Traurig, LLP, News Alert for Pipe Investors SEC Clarifies Position on
Shelf Registration Issues Relating to PIPEs, PRIVATE FUNDS WEEKLY ROUNDUP, Jan.
29, 2007, http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2007/0129.pdf. The law firm Greenberg
Traurig summarized the guidance as follows:
0 The SEC will apply a cap to the registration of common
stock underlying convertible securities (such as notes, warrants and
preferred stock) equal to 3 3 % of the issuer's float. This cap
includes convertible securities with variable conversion prices (such
as re-set provisions). On a facts and circumstances basis, the SEC
will consider permitting an issuer to register more shares than this
cap where there are mitigating factors based upon the six factor test
contained in the SEC's telephone interpretation [see supra note
182], such as: (i) a large number of investors unaffiliated with the
issuer and each other; (ii) a conversion price that is fixed and above
market; (iii) a minimal discount price for the securities issued in the
PIPE; (iv) a lengthy holding period for the securities held by the
investor; and, (v) selling shareholders consisting of retail investors
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remains unclear. Some people speculate that the underlying policy is
"protect[ing] the small investor from risk of dilution."'8 8 However, the fact
that hedge funds are taking advantage of regulatory loopholes to profit
arguably at the expense of existing PIPE issuer shareholders surely plays a
role.
C. The Impact on Small Companies
The end result of the SEC's new position on primary versus
secondary offerings is essentially a cap on the size of PIPE deals.189 In
terms of dollar amounts, the lower the dollar value of a company's public
float, the less money it will be able to raise through a PIPE. Hence, the cap
hits small companies the hardest, the very companies that have few, if any,
other financing options.
In theory, an issuer could avoid the cap by registering the PIPE
shares for resale as a primary shelf offering under Rule 415.190 In practice,
however, this will rarely, if ever, be an option. A hedge fund likely will be
unwilling to invest in a PIPE deal where the resale will be registered as a
primary offering because, as noted above, the fund would then be subject to
Section 11 liability. 19 1 If a fund was nonetheless willing to invest, it would
rather than hedge funds and other professional investors who are in
the business of underwriting securities.
* The SEC is expected to allow an issuer to exceed the 33%
cap where the issuer is registering solely common stock rather than
convertible securities. However, this will be permitted on a case-
by-case basis applying the six factor test set forth above.
* Where an issuer breaks up the registration of securities
sold in a PIPE transaction into several registration statements or
breaks up the PIPE financing itself into several similar transactions
to comply with the 33% cap, the SEC will not clear a follow-on
registration statement until the LATER of(i) 6 months and (ii) 60
days following the date all or substantially all of the previously
registered securities are sold. Accordingly, investors may be forced
to sell out of their registered positions in order for the balance of
their securities to be registered although Mr. Lynn acknowledged
after questioning from the crowd that the SEC may "reconsider" this
element. If the issuer commences another deal for another purpose
(such as to finance an acquisition rather than for working capital)
while the first registration statement is effective and shares remain
eligible for re-sale, the SEC will not block the second registration
statement. They will apply the integration test and look for
overlapping investors, similar terms and similar use of proceeds. Id.
1 See Sargent, supra note 47, at 13.
"9 See id
190 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(ix) (2006).
191 See Sargent, supra note 47, at 13 (noting that underwriter status would require hedge
funds investing in PIPEs to perform a substantial amount of due diligence on the PIPE
issuer, "an undertaking that most hedge funds are simply not will to do").
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obviously require compensation for the Section 11 liability risk and
attendant increased due diligence expense thereby making the deal even
more expensive for the PIPE issuer.
Vi. CONCLUSION
PIPE financing has emerged as a major funding source for small
public companies. The large bulk of this financing comes from hedge
funds. Hedge funds invest in PIPE deals because it is profitable to do so.
By legally skirting various regulations, hedge funds are able to earn market-
beating returns. Hence, it is not surprising that the SEC has taken steps to
tighten the regulatory net.
However, whether further regulation is necessary or warranted is an
open question. While PIPE deals are susceptible to abuse, as documented
in the various SEC enforcement actions mentioned above, minimizing fraud
is just half of the equation. The SEC should also consider the effect
increased regulation will have on the PIPE market, considering that it
represents the sole financing option for many small public companies.
Consequently, any further regulation should be done in a measured and
transparent manner in the form of proposed rules subject to public comment
and economic analysis. The PIPE market is now too important for new rule
interpretations to be promulgated informally through comment letters and
speeches.
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